The main objective of the paper is to explain the leverage of French companies in the wine industry. Different capital structure theories are reviewed in order to formulate testable propositions concerning the levels of debt of the French wine companies. A number of regression models are developed to test the hypotheses.
Introduction
The main objective of the paper is to explain the leverage of French companies in the wine industry. Empirical studies do not lead to a consensus with regard to the significant determinants of the structure of the capital.
Step of the article: theories, variables, proxies for the variables. It is difficult to find variables which represent in a relevant way the theoretical determinants of the capitalization. The problem arises again for the relation between the variables and the proxies which are used to measure them.
2. Theoretical discussion and empirical determinants 2.1.Theories of capital structure Since the seminal Modigliani and Miller, 1958 paper showing that subject to some restrictive conditions the impact of financing on the value of the firm is irrelevant, the literature on capital structure has been expanded by many theoretical and empirical contributions. Three principal theories aim to explain corporate leverage and its dynamic ( 1 ). According to the traditional (or static) tradeoff theory (TOT), firms select optimal capital structure by comparing the tax benefits of the debt, the costs of bankruptcy and the costs of agency of debt and equity, that is to say the disciplinary role of debt and the fact that debt suffers less from informational costs than outside equity (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Stiglitz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Titman 1984) . So optimal leverage minimizes cost of capital and maximizes firm value. In the so called pecking order theory (POT) (Donaldson, 1961; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) , because of asymmetries of information between insiders and outsiders, the company will prefer the financing by internal resources, then by debt and finally by stockholders' equity. The debt ratio depends then on the degree of asymmetry of information, of the capacity of self-financing of the company and the various constraints which it meets in the access to the various sources of financing. The dynamic trade-off theory (DTOT) tries a compromise between TOT and POT (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner, 1989; Leland, 1994 Leland, , 1998 . Although, due to information asymmetries, market imperfections and transaction costs, many companies allow their leverage ratios to drift away from their targets for a time, when the distance becomes large enough managers take steps to move their companies back toward the targets. While the POT explains short-run deviation from the target, the traditional tradeoff theory holds in the long run. According to the theory of the market timing and inertia, the structure of debt is the result at a given time of a historical process. According to the approach of the market timing (Jalilvand & Harris (1984) , Korajczyk and Al (1991) , Lucas & McDonald (1991), Jung and , Loughran and Al (1994) , Baker & Wugler (2002) ) the leaders will carry out increases in the capital when they think that the actions are overestimated. A small debt ratio must thus follow a long period of Market to Book high ratio. According to Welch (2004) , the companies quickly do not adjust their debt ratio to the fluctuations of the value of the stockholders' equity, one period of rise of the courses must thus be accompanied by small debt ratios. In the static approach of the theory of the trade off, it is a question of explaining the target debt ratio, the debt ratios of the companies are supposed to converge towards the target debt ratio, but the process of convergence is not explicitly taken into account. The empirical tests are carried out only on samples out of instantaneous cut. Dynamic approach (Fisher and Al (1989) , Leland (1998) ) explicitly model the process of adjustment dynamic of the debt ratio towards the target debt ratio. This approach raises several questions: do the companies have they a target debt ratio? If the answer is positive, which is the speed of adjustment towards this ratio? Lastly, which are the determinants this speed of adjustment? In comparison with the literature, no consensus seems to have emerged on the answer to these three questions. The answer to the first question is still largely discussed. Baker and Wurgler (2002) notice that the effects of the market timing of the issues of shares on the structure of the capital are long. The firms thus do not seem in a hurry to adjust the debt ratio. The authors conclude from it that the debt ratio is more the result of the history of the emissions of stockholders' equity than that of a dynamic optimization. Welch (2004) also interprets the inertia of the companies presented higher like an element of proof of the absence of convergence towards an optimum ratio. The answers to the second question are not homogeneous: -relatively slow speed (Taggart (1977) , Fama & French (2002) ), -relatively fast speed (). Lastly, with regard to the third question, the answers are varied. The speed of adjustment depends on the liquidity on the credits on the firm Taggart (1977) , of the nature of the sources of financing available Marsh (1982) . A variation can exist between the real debt ratio and the debt ratio targets not only because of the costs of transaction but also because the companies are subjected to certain numbers constraints of access to the various banking sources of financing or market (Jalilvand & Harris (1984) , Myers (1984) ).
2.2.Empirical determinants of capital structure
As in much empirical research, theoretical constructs must be proxied indirectly through the use of firm or environmental characteristics. The links between the theoretical determinants and the variables chosen in the empirical studies are complex. Their justification rests on the mobilization of additional theories and on purely empirical observations. So the selected empirical variables suffer from several weaknesses: -Length of the causal chain which connects the variable chosen to the theoretical determinants and then with the debt ratio itself, -Ambiguity of the variable influence on the capital structure. Indeed, the selected variable can have contradictory effects on the capital structure owing to the fact that several causal chains connect it to the debt ratio or that some purely empirical relations are not generally accepted. Several causal chains on the basis of the explanatory variable can lead to the explained variable outcome with relations in contrary direction or relations in the same direction for two different theories. In this case there is not decides between theories. For example, according to a first causal chain, the firms of big size have relatively less costs of bankruptcy what allows them higher debt ratios. According to one second causal chain, asymmetry on the firms of big size is lower, from where the least required to be financed in-house or by debt and a smaller debt ratio.
In the following we use classical capital structure determinants: size, asset structure, profitability, risk, growth.
Size
There are several theoretical reasons why firm size would be related to the capital structure. Smaller firms may find it relatively more costly to resolve informational asymmetries with lenders and financiers, which discourages the use of outside financing (Chung, 1993; Grinblatt and Titman, 1998) and should increase the preference of smaller firms for equity relative to debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) . However, this problem may be mitigated with the use of short term debt (Titman & Wessels, 1988) . Relative bankruptcy costs and probability of bankruptcy (larger firms are more diversified and fail less often) are an inverse function of firm size (Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 1982; Pettit and Singer, 1985; Titman and Wessels, 1988) . A further reason for smaller firms to have lower leverage ratios is that smaller firms are more likely to be liquidated when they are in financial distress (Ozkan, 1996) .
Asset structure
The degree to which the firms' assets are tangible and generic should result in the firm having a greater liquidation value. By pledging the assets as collateral (Myers, 1977; Scott, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990) or arranging so that a fixed charge is directly placed to particular tangible assets of the firm, also reduces adverse selection and moral hazard costs (Long and Malitz, 1992) . Bank financing will depend upon whether the lending can be secured by tangible assets (Storey, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998) . Tangible assets could also have a negative impact on financial leverage by augmenting risk through the increase of operating leverage (Hutchinson and Hunter, 1995) . Part of the intangible assets, such as reputation, becomes quasi-tangible and interpreted by debt holders as a guarantee (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993) .
Liquidity ratios may have a mixed impact on the capital structure decision. Companies with higher liquidity ratios might support a relatively higher debt ratio due to greater ability to meet short-term obligations. On the other hand firms with greater liquidities may use them to finance their investments. Therefore the companies' liquidities should exert a negative impact on its leverage ratio (Ozkan, 2001) . Moreover the liquid assets can be used to show the extend to which these assets can be manipulated by shareholders at the expense of bondholders (Prowse, 1990) .
Profitability
There are conflicting theoretical predictions on the effects of profitability on leverage. Following the POT, profitable firms, which have access to retained profits, can use these for firm financing rather than accessing outside sources. Jensen, 1986 , predicts a positive relationship between profitability and financial leverage if the market for corporate control is effective because debt reduces the free cash flow generated by profitability. From the TOT point of view more profitable firms are exposed to lower risks of bankruptcy and have greater incentive to employ debt to exploit interest tax shields.
Risk
Since higher variability in earnings indicates that the probability of bankruptcy increases, we can expect that firms with higher income variability have lower leverage (Bradley et al., 1984; Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988) . Firms that have high operating risk can lower the volatility of the net profit by reducing the level of debt. A negative relation between operating risk and leverage is also expected from a POT perspective: firms with high volatility of results try to accumulate cash during good years, to avoid under-investment issues in the future.
Growth
Following TOT, for companies with growth opportunities, the use of debt is limited as in the case of bankruptcy, the value of growth opportunities will be close to zero, growth opportunities are particular case of intangible assets (Myers, 1984; Williamson, 1988 and Raviv, 1990) . Firms with less growth prospects should use debt because it has a disciplinary role (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) . Firms with growth opportunities may invest suboptimally, and therefore creditors will be more reluctant to lend for long horizons. This problem can be solved by short-term financing (Titman and Wessels, 1988) or by convertible bonds (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979) .
Applying pecking order arguments, growing firms place a greater demand on the internally generated funds of the firm. Consequentially, firms with relatively high growth will tend to issue securities less subject to information asymmetries, i.e. shot-term debt. This should lead to firms with relatively higher growth having more leverage.
2.2.6. Non-debt tax shield Non-debt tax shield like tax deduction for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefit of debt financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) . Therefore, the tax advantage of leverage decreases when other tax deduction increases.
Age
Young firms tend to be externally financed while older tend to accumulate retained earnings so age must be negatively related to leverage (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) .
Industry effect
Since asset risk, asset type, and requirement for external funds vary by industry we could expect average debt ratios to vary from industry to industry (Myers, 1984; Haris and Raviv, 1991) . The sector characteristics (degree of concentration, barriers at the entry and the exit, technological changes) have an influence on the debt ratio ( 2 ).
Empirical study
We use explanatory variables to proxy for the determinants of capital structure as presented in section 2.2.
Data, variables and methodology
All the data used in this study was gathered from the Plimsoll database on the period 2000 -2003 (Plimsoll, 2005 (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) .
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In an attempt to determine if legal structure and the associated differences in governance have an impact on leverage, we use a dummy variable to distinguish between cooperatives and other legal structures.
As for methodology, we have used the ordinary least square equations and the stepwise method ( 5 ) because we have different proxies for the same determinant and we want to keep only the most significant independent variables.
Results
To used the largest sample as possible we conduct two different empirical studies, the first one with only year 2003 for which we have the largest number of companies with complete data, the second one with all the companies with complete data for all the four years. So in the first studies we eliminate the measures of risk (volatility) and the measures of growth. 
